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Abstract—We discuss the effect of sequential error injection
on information leakage under a network code. We formulate a
network code for the single transmission setting and the multiple
transmission setting. Under this formulation, we show that the
eavesdropper cannot improve the power of eavesdropping by
sequential error injection when the operations in the network are
linear operations. We demonstrate the usefulness of this reduction
theorem by applying a concrete example of network.
Index Terms—secrecy analysis, secure network coding, sequen-
tial injection, passive attack, active attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure network coding offers a method for securely trans-
mitting information from an authorized sender to an authorized
receiver. Cai and Yeung [1] discussed the secrecy when the
malicious adversary, Eve, wiretaps a subset EE of the set
E of all the channels in a network. Using the universal
hashing lemma [2], [3], [4], the papers [5], [6] showed the
existence of a secrecy code that works universally for any
type of eavesdropper when the cardinality of EE is bounded.
In addition, the paper [7] discussed the construction of such
a code. As another type of attack on information transmis-
sion via a network, a malicious adversary contaminates the
communication by changing the information on a subset EA
of E. Using an error correction, the papers [8], [9], [10], [11]
proposed a method to protect the message from contamination.
That is, we require that the authorized receiver correctly
recovers the message, which is called robustness.
As another possibility, we consider the case when the ma-
licious adversary combines eavesdropping and contamination.
That is, contaminating a part of the channels, the malicious
adversary might improve the ability of eavesdropping while a
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parallel network offers no such a possibility [12], [13], [14].
In fact, in arbitrarily varying channel model, noise injection is
allowed after Eve’s eavesdropping, but Eve does not eavesdrop
the channel after Eve’s noise injection [15], [16], [17], [19][18,
Table I]. The paper [21] also discusses secrecy in the same
setting while it addresses the network model. The studies
[7], [20] discussed the secrecy when Eve eavesdrops the
information transmitted on the channels in EE after noises
are injected in EA, but they assume that Eve does not know
the information of the injected noise. The paper [21] discusses
secrecy only for a passive attack.
In contrast, this paper focuses on network, and discusses the
secrecy when Eve adds artificial information to the information
transmitted on the channels in EA, eavesdrops the information
transmitted on the channels in EE , and estimates the original
message from the eavesdropped information and the informa-
tion of the injected noises. We call this type of attack an active
attack and call an attack without contamination a passive
attack. Specially, we call each of Eve’s active operations a
strategy. When EA ⊂ EE and any active attack is available
for Eve, she is allowed to arbitrarily modify the information
on the channels in EA sequentially based on the obtained
information.
This paper aims to show a reduction theorem for an ac-
tive attack, i.e., the fact that no strategy can improve Eve’s
information when every operation in the network is linear and
Eve’s contamination satisfies a natural causal condition. When
the network is not well synchronized, Eve can make an attack
across several channels. This reduction theorem holds even
under this kind of attack. In fact, there is an example having a
non-linear node operation such that Eve can improve her per-
formance to extract information from eavesdropping an edge
outgoing an intermediate node by adding artificial information
to an edge incoming the intermediate node [32]. This example
shows the necessity of linearity for this reduction theorem.
Although our discussion can be extended to the multicast and
multiple-unicast cases, for simplicity, we consider the unicast
setting in the following discussion.
Further, we apply our general result to the analysis of a
concrete example of a network. In this network, we demon-
strate that any active attack cannot improve the performance
of eavesdropping. However, in the single transmission case
over the finite field F2, the error correction and the error
detection is impossible over this contamination. To resolve this
problem, this paper addresses the multiple transmission case
in addition to the single transmission case. In the multiple
transmission case, the sender uses the same network multiple
times, and the topology and dynamics of the network do
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not change during these transmissions. While several papers
discussed this model, many of them discussed the multiple
transmission case only with contamination [23], [24], [25]
or eavesdropping [5], [6]. Only the paper [21] addressed it
with contamination and eavesdropping, i.e., it assumed that
all contaminations are done after eavesdropping. We formulate
the multiple transmission case when each transmission has
no correlation with the previous transmission while injected
noise might have such a correlation. Then, we show the above
type of reduction theorem for an active attack even under the
multiple transmission case. We apply this result to the multiple
transmission over the above example of a network, in which,
the error correction and the error detection are possible over
this contamination. Hence, the secrecy and the correctness
hold in this case.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II discusses only the single transmission setting that
has only a single transmission and Section III does the multiple
transmission setting that has n transmissions. Two types of
multiple transmission settings are formulated. Then, we state
our reduction theorem in both settings. In Section IV, we state
the conclusion.
II. SINGLE TRANSMISSION SETTING
A. Generic model
In this subsection, we give a generic model, and discuss its
relation with a concrete network model in the latter subsec-
tions. We consider the unicast setting of network coding on
a network. Assume that the authorized sender, Alice, intends
to send information to the authorized receiver, Bob, via the
network. Although the network is composed of m1 edges and
m2 vertecies, as shown in later, the model can be simplified as
follows when the node operations are linear. We assume that
Alice inputs the input variable X in Fm3q and Bob receives
the output variable YB in Fm4q , where Fq is a finite field
whose order is a power q of the prime p. We also assume that
the malicious adversary, Eve, wiretaps the information YE in
Fm6q 1. Then, we adopt the model with matrices KB ∈ Fm4×m3q
and KE ∈ Fm6×m3q , in which,the variables X, YB , and YE
satisfy their relations
YB = KBX, YE = KEX. (1)
This attack is a conventional wiretap model and is called a
passive attack to distinguish an active attack, which will be
introduced later. Section II-B will explain how this model is
derived from a directed graph with EE and linear operations
on nodes.
In this paper, we address a stronger attack, in which, Eve
injects noise Z ∈ Fm5q . Hence, using matrices HB ∈ Fm4×m5q
and HE ∈ Fm6×m5q , we rewrite the relations (1) as
YB = KBX +HBZ, YE = KEX +HEZ, (2)
which is called a wiretap and addition model. The i-th injected
noise Zi (the i-th component of Z) is decided by a function
αi of YE . Although a part of YE is a function of αi, this
1In this paper, we denote the vector on Fq by a bold letter. But, we use a
non-bold letter to describe a scalar and a matrix.
point does not make a problem for causality, as explained
in Section II-D. In this paper, when a vector has the j-th
component xj , the vector is written as [xj ]1≤j≤a, where the
subscript 1 ≤ j ≤ a expresses the range of the index j. Thus,
the set α = [αi]1≤i≤m5 of the functions can be regarded as
Eve’s strategy, and we call this attack an active attack with
a strategy α. That is, an active attack is identified by a pair
of a strategy α and a wiretap and addition model decided by
K,H . Here, we treat KB ,KE , HB , and HE as deterministic
values, and denote the pairs (KB ,KE) and (HB , HE) by
K and H , respectively. Hence, our model is written as the
triplet (K,H, α). As shown in the latter subsections, under
the linearity assumption on the node operations, the triplet
(K,H, α) is decided from the network topology (a directed
graph with EA and EE) and dynamics of the network. Here,
we should remark that the relation (2) is based on the linearity
assumption for node operations. Since this assumption is the
restriction for the protocol, it does not restrict the eavesdrop-
per’s strategy.
TABLE I
CHANNEL PARAMETERS
m1 Number of edges
m2 Number of vertecies
m3 Dimension of Alice’s input information X
m4 Dimension of Bob’s observed information YB
m5 Dimension of Eve’s injected information Z
m6 Dimension of Eve’s wiretapped information YE
m7 m1 −m3
We impose several types for regularity conditions for Eve’s
strategy α, which are demanded from causality. Notice that
αi is a function of the vector [YE,j ]1≤j≤m6 . Now, we take
the causality with respect to α into account. Here, we assume
that the assigned index i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m5 expresses the time-
ordering of injection. That is, we assign the index i for 1 ≤ i ≤
m5 according to the order of injections. Hence, we assume that
αi is decided by a part of Eve’s observed variables. We say that
subsets wi ⊂ {1, . . . ,m6} for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m5} are the domain
index subsets for α when the function αi is given as a function
of the vector [YE,j ]j∈wi . Here, the notation j ∈ wi means that
the j-th eavesdropping is done before the i-th injection, i.e., wi
expresses the set of indexes corresponding to the symbols that
do effect the i-th injection. Hence, the eavesdropped symbol
YE,j does not depend on the injected symbol zi for j ∈ wi.
Since the decision of the injected noise does not depend on
the consequences of the decision, we introduce the following
causal condition.
Definition 1. We say that the domain index subsets
{wi}1,...,m5 satisfy the causal condition when the following
two conditions hold;
(A1) The relation HE;j,i = 0 holds for j ∈ wi.
(A2) The relation w1 ⊆ w2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ wm5 holds.
As a necessary condition of the causal condition, we intro-
duce the following uniqueness condition for the function αi,
which is given as a function of the vector [YE,j ]1≤j≤m6 .
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Definition 2. For any value of x, there uniquely exists y ∈
Fm6q such that
y = KEx +HEα(y). (3)
This condition is called the uniqueness condition for α.
Examples of a network with wi, [HE;j,i]i,j will be given in
Subsection II-E. Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. When a strategy α has domain index subsets
to satisfy the causal condition, the strategy α satisfies the
uniqueness condition.
Proof: When the causal condition holds, we show the fact
that yj′ is given as a function of KEx for any j′ ∈ wi by
induction with respect to the index i = 1, . . . ,m5, which
expresses the order of the injected information. This fact yields
the uniqueness condition.
For j ∈ w1, we have yj = (KEx)j because (HEα(y))j
is zero. Hence, the statement with i = 1 holds. We choose
j ∈ wi+1 \ wi. Let zi′ be the i′-th injected information. Due
to Conditions (A1) and (A2), yj − (KEx)j = (HEz)j is a
function of z1 = a(y)1, · · · , zi = a(y)i. Since the assumption
of the induction guarantees that z1, . . . , zi are functions of
[yj′ ]j′∈wi , z1, . . . , zi are functions of KEx. Then, we find
that yj = (KEx)j + (HEz)j is given as a function of KEx
for any j ∈ wi+1 \ wi. That is, the strategy α satisfies the
uniqueness condition.
Now, we have the following reduction theorem.
Theorem 1 (Reduction Theorem). When the strategy α sat-
isfies the uniqueness condition, Eve’s information YE(α)
with strategy α can be calculated from Eve’s information
YE(0) with strategy 0 (the passive attack), and YE(0) is also
calculated from YE(α). Hence, we have the equation
I(X;YE)[0] =I(X;YE)[α], (4)
I(X;YE)[α] expresses the mutual information between X and
YE under the strategy α.
Proof: Since YE(0) = KEX and YE(α) = KEX + HEZ,
due to the uniqueness condition of the strategy α, we can
uniquely evaluate YE(α) from YE(0) = KEX and α.
Therefore, we have I(X;YE)[0] ≥ I(X;YE)[α]. Conversely,
since YE(0) is given as a function (YE(α)−HEZ) of YE(α),
Z, and HE , we have the opposite inequality.
This theorem shows that the information leakage of the
active attack with the strategy α is the same as the information
leakage of the passive attack. Hence, to guarantee the secrecy
under an arbitrary active attack, it is sufficient to show secrecy
under the passive attack. However, there is an example of
non-linear network such that this kind of reduction does not
hold [32]. In fact, even when the network does not have
synchronization so that the information transmission on an
edges starts before the end of the information transmission on
the previous edge, the above reduction theorem hold under the
uniqueness condition.
B. Construction of KB ,KE from concrete network model
Next, we discuss how we can obtain the generic passive
attack model (1) from a concretely structured network cod-
ing, i.e. communications identified by directed edges and
linear operations by parties identified by nodes. We con-
sider the unicast setting of network coding on a network,
which is given as a directed graph (V,E), where the set
V := {v(1), . . . , v(m2)} of vertices expresses the set of
nodes and the set E := {e(1), . . . , e(m1)} of edges expresses
the set of communication channels, where a communication
channel means a packet in network engineering, i.e., a single
communication channel can transmit single character in Fq .
In the following, we identify the set E with {1, . . . ,m1}, i.e,
we identify the index of an edge with the edge itself. Here,
the directed graph (V,E) is not necessarily acyclic. When a
channel transmits information from a node v(i) ∈ V to another
node v(i′) ∈ V , it is written as (v(i), v(i′)) ∈ E.
In the single transmission, the source node has several
elements of Fq and sends each of them via its outgoing edges
in the order of assigned number of edges. Each intermediate
node keeps received information via incoming edges. Then,
for each outgoing edge, the intermediate node calculates one
element of Fq from previously received information, and sends
it via the outgoing edge. That is, every outgoing information
from a node v(i) via a channel e(j) depends only on the
incoming information into the node v(i) via channels e(j′)
such that j′ < j. The operations on all nodes are assumed
to be linear on the finite field Fq with prime power q. Bob
receives the information YB in Fm4q on the edges of a subset
EB := {e(ζB(1)), . . . , e(ζB(m4))} ⊂ E, where ζB is a
strictly increasing function from {1, . . . ,m4} to {1, . . . ,m1}.
Let X˜j be the information on the edge e(j). In the following,
we describe the information on the m7 := m1 − m3 edges
that are not directly linked to the source node because m3
expresses the number of Alices input symbols. When the edge
e(j) is an outgoing edge of the node v(i), the information X˜j
is given as a linear combination of the information on the
edges incoming to the node v(i). We choose an m1 × m1
matrix θ = (θj,j′) such that X˜j =
∑
j′ θj,j′X˜j′ , where θj,j′
is zero unless e(j′) is an edge incoming to v(i). The matrix
θ is the coefficient matrix of this network.
Now, from causality, we can assume that each node makes
the transmissions on the outgoing edges in the order of
the numbers assigned to the edges. At the first stage, all
m3 information generated at the source node are directly
transmitted via e(1), · · · e(m3) respectively. Then, at time j,
the information transmission on the edge e(j + m3) is done
Hence, naturally, we impose the condition
θj,j′ = 0 for j′ ≥ j, (5)
which is called the partial time-ordered condition for θ. Then,
to describe the information on m7 edges that are not directly
linked to the source node, we define m7 m1 ×m1 matrices
M1, . . . ,Mm7 . The j-th m1 ×m1 matrix Mj gives the infor-
mation on the edge e(j+m3) as a function of the information
on edges {e(j′)}1≤j′≤m1 at time j. The j + m3-th row
vector of the matrix Mj is defined by [θj+m3,j′ ]1≤j′≤m1 . The
remaining part of Mj , i.e., the i-th row vector for i 6= j+m3
is defined by [δi,j′ ]1≤j′≤m1 and δi,j′ is the Kronecker delta.
Since
∑m3
i=1(Mj · · ·M1)j′,iXi expresses the information on
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edge e(j′) at time j, we have
YB,j =
m3∑
i=1
(Mm7 · · ·M1)ζB(j),iXi (6)
While the output of the matrix Mm7 · · ·M1 takes values in
Fm1q , we focus the projection PB to the subspace Fm4q that
corresponds to the m4 components observed by Bob. That is,
PB is a m4×m1 matrix to satisfy PB;i,j = δζB(i),j . Similarly,
we use the projection PA (an m1×m3 matrix) as PA;i,j = δi,j .
Due to (6), the matrix KB := PBMm7 · · ·M1PA satisfies the
first equation in (1).
The malicious adversary, Eve, wiretaps the informa-
tion YE in Fm6q on the edges of a subset EE :=
{e(ζE(1)), . . . , e(ζE(m6))} ⊂ E, where ζE is a strictly
increasing function from {1, . . . ,m6} to {1, . . . ,m1}. Similar
to (6), we have
YE,j =
m3∑
i=1
(Mm7 · · ·M1)ζE(j),iXi. (7)
We employ the projection PE (an m6 × m1 matrix) to
the subspace Fm6q that corresponds to the m6 components
eavesdropped by Eve. That is, PE;i,j = δζE(i),j . Then, we
obtain the matrix KE as PEMm7 · · ·M1PA. Due to (6), the
matrix KE := PEMm7 · · ·M1PA satisfies the second equation
in (1).
In summary the topology and dynamics (operations on the
intermediate nodes) of the network, including the places of
attached edges decides the graph (V,E), the coefficients θi,j ,
and functions ζB , ζE , uniquely gives the two matrices KB and
KE . Subsection II-E will give an example for this model. Here,
we emphasize that we do not assume the acyclic condition for
the graph (V,E). We can use this relaxed condition because
we have only one transmission in the current discussion. That
is, due to the partial time-ordered condition for θ, we can
uniquely define our matrices KB and KE , which is a similar
way to [36, Section V-B]2. However, when the graph has a
cycle and we have n transmissions, there is a possibility of
the correlation with the delayed information dependently of
the time ordering. As a result, it is difficult to analyze secrecy
for the cyclic network coding.
C. Construction of HB , HE from concrete network model
We identify the wiretap and addition model from a concrete
network structure. We assume that Eve injects the noise in a
part of edges EA ⊂ E as well as eavesdrops the edges EE .
The elements of the subset EA are expressed as
EA = {e(η(1)), . . . , e(η(m5))} by using a function η from
{1, . . . ,m5} to {1, . . . ,m1}, where the function η is not
necessarily monotonically increasing function. To give the
matrices HB and HE , modifying the matrix Mj , we de-
fine the new matrix M ′j as follows The j + m3-th row
vector of the new matrix M ′j is defined by [θj+m3,j′ +
δj+m3,j′ ]1≤j′≤m1 . The remaining part of M
′
j , i.e., the i-th
row vector for i 6= j + m3 is defined by [δi,j′ ]1≤j′≤m1 .
2Λ of Ahlswede-Cai-Li-Yeung corresponds to the number of edges that are
not connected to the source node in our paper.
Since
∑m3
i=1(Mj · · ·M1)j′,iXi +
∑m5
i′=1(M
′
j · · ·M ′1)j′,η(i′)Zi′
expresses the information on edge e(j′) at time j, we have
YB,j =
m3∑
i=1
(Mm7 · · ·M1)ζB(j),iXi
+
m5∑
i′=1
(M ′m7 · · ·M ′1)ζB(j),η(i′)Zi′ (8)
YE,j =
m3∑
i=1
(Mm7 · · ·M1)ζE(j),iXi
+
m5∑
i′=1
(M ′m7 · · ·M ′1 − I)ζE(j),η(i′)Zi′ . (9)
When Eve eavesdrops the edges EE ∩ EA, she obtains the
information on EE ∩ EA before her noise injection. Hence,
to express her obtained information on EE ∩EA, we need to
subtract her injected information on EE∩EA. Hence, we need
−I in the second term of (9). We introduce the projection
PE,A (an m1 × m5 matrix) as PE,A;i,j = δi,η(j). Due to
(8) and (9), the matrices HB := PBM ′m7 · · ·M ′1PE,A and
HE := PE(M
′
m7 · · ·M ′1 − I)PE,A satisfy conditions (2) with
the matrices KB and KE , respectively. This model (KB , KE ,
HB , HE) to give (2) is called the wiretap and addition model
determined by (V,E) and (EE , EA, θ), which expresses the
topology and dynamics.
D. Strategy and order of communication
To discuss the active attack, we see how the causal condition
for the subsets {wi}1,...,m5 follows from the network topology
in the wiretap and addition model. We choose the domain
index subsets {wi}1≤i≤m5 for α, i.e., Eve chooses the added
error Zi on the edge e(η(i)) ∈ EA as a function αi of the vec-
tor [YE,j ]j∈wi . Since the order of Eve’s attack is characterized
by the function η from {1, . . . ,m5} to EA ⊂ {1, . . . ,m1}, we
discuss what condition for the pair (η, {wi}i) guarantees the
causal condition for the subsets {wi}i.
First, one may assume that the tail node of the edge e(j)
sends the information to the edge e(j) after the head node of
the edge e(j−1) receives the information to the edge e(j−1).
Since this condition determines the order of Eve’s attack,
the function η must be a strictly increasing function from
{1, . . . ,m5} to {1, . . . ,m1}. Also, due to this time ordering,
the subset wi needs to be {j|η(i) ≥ ζE(j)} or its subset. We
call these two conditions the full time-ordered condition for
the function η and the subsets {wi}i. Since the function η
is strictly increasing, Condition (A2) for the causal condition
holds. Since the relation (5) implies that M ′m7 · · ·M ′1 − I is
a lower triangular matrix with zero diagonal elements, the
strictly increasing property of η yield that
HE;j,i = 0 when η(i) ≥ ζE(j), (10)
which implies Condition (A1) for the causal condition. In this
way, the full time-ordered condition for the function η and the
subsets {wi}i satisfies the causal condition.
However, the full time ordered condition does not hold in
general even when we reorder the numbers assigned to the
edges. That is, if the network is not well synchronized, Eve
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can make an attack across several channels, i.e., it is possible
that Eve might intercept (i.e., wiretap and contaminate) the
information of an edge before the head node of the previous
edge receives the information on the edge. Hence, we consider
the case when the partial time-ordered condition holds, but the
full time-ordered condition does not necessarily hold3. That
is, the function η from {1, . . . ,m5} to E is injective but is
not necessarily monotone increasing. Given the matrix θ, we
define the function γθ(j) := minj′{j′|θj′,j 6= 0}. Here, when
no index j′ satisfies the condition θj′,j 6= 0, γθ(j) is defined
to be m1 +1. Then, we say that the function η and the subsets
{wi}i are admissible under θ when {e(k)|k ∈ Im η} = EA,
the subsets {wi}i satisfy Condition (A2) for the causal con-
dition, and any element j ∈ wi satisfies
ζE(j) < γθ(η(i)). (11)
Here, Im η expresses the image of the function η. The condi-
tion (11) and the condition (5) imply the following condition;
For j ∈ wi, there is no sequence ζE(j) = j1 > j2, . . . > jl =
η(i) such that
θji,ji+1 6= 0. (12)
This condition implies Condition (A1) for the causal condition.
Since the admissibility under θ is natural, even when the full
time-ordered condition does not hold, the causal condition can
be naturally derived.
Given two admissible pairs (η, {wi}i) and (η′, {w′i}i), we
say that the pair (η, {wi}i) is superior to (η′, {w′i}i) for Eve
when w′
η′−1(j) ⊂ wη−1(j) for any j ∈ EA. Now, we discuss the
optimal choice of (η, {wi}i) in this sense when EA is given.
That is, we choose the subset wi as large as possible under the
admissibility under θ. Then, we choose the bijective function
ηo from {1, . . . ,m5} to EA such that γθ ◦ ηo is monotone
increasing. Then, we define wo,i := {j|ζE(j) < γθ(ηo(i))},
which satisfies the admissibility under θ. Conditions (A1) and
(A2) for the causal condition. Further, when the pair (η, {wi}i)
is admissible under θ, the condition (11) implies wη−1(j) ⊂
wo,η−1o (j) for j ∈ EA, i.e., wo,i is the largest subset under
the admissibility under θ. Hence, we obtain the optimality of
(ηo, {wo,i}i). Although the choice of ηo is not unique, the
choice of wo,η−1o (j) for j ∈ EA is unique.
E. Secrecy in concrete network model
In this subsection, as an example, we consider the network
given in Figs. 1 and 2, which shows that our framework
can be applied to the network without synchronization. Alice
sends the variables X1, . . . , X4 ∈ Fq to nodes v(1), v(2), v(3),
and v(4) via the edges e(1), e(2), e(3), and e(4), respectively.
The edges e(5), e(6), e(8), e(10) send the elements received
from the edges e(1), e(5), e(5), e(8), respectively. The edges
e(7), e(9), and e(11) send the sum of two elements received
3For an example, we consider the following case. Eve gets the information
on the first edge. Then, she gets the information on the second edge before she
hands over the information on the first edge to the tail node of the first edge.
In this case, she can change the information on the first edge based on the
information on the first and second edges. Then, the time-ordered condition
(10) does not hold.
S
T
v(1)
v(2)
v(3)
v(4) e(2)
e(3)
e(4)
e(7)
e(10)
e(11) e(9)
e(6)
e(8)
1Z Eve
,1EY
,3EY
,2EY
2Ze(1) e(5)
,4EY
,5EY
Fig. 1. Network of Subsection II-E with name of edges
S
T
v(1)
v(2)
v(3)
v(4)
1X
2X
3X
4X
1X
1 3X X+
1 4X X+
1X
1X
1X
1 2X X+
Fig. 2. Network of Subsection II-E with network flow
from the edge pairs (e(2), e(5)), (e(3), e(6)), and (e(4), e(8)),
respectively.
Bob received elements via the edges e(7), e(9), e(11),
which are written as YB,1, YB,2, YB,3, respectively. Then, the
matrix KB is given as
KB =
 1 1 0 01 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
 . (13)
Then, m3 = 4 and m4 = 3.
Now, we assume that Eve eavesdrops the edges
e(2), e(5), e(6), e(7), e(8), i.e., all edges connected
to v(2), and contaminates the edge e(2), e(5). Then,
we set ζB(1) = 7, ζB(2) = 9, ζB(3) = 11 and
ζE(1) = 2, ζE(2) = 5, ζE(3) = 6, ζE(4) = 7, ζE(5) = 8. Eve
can choose the function η as
η(1) = 5, η(2) = 2 (14)
while η(1) = 2, η(2) = 5 is possible. In the following, we
choose (14). Since γθ(2) = 7 and γθ(5) = 6, the subsets wi
are given as
w1 := wo,1 = {1, 2}, w2 := wo,2 = {1, 2, 3} (15)
This case satisfies Conditions (A1) and (A2). Hence, this
model satisfies the causal condition. Lemma 1 guarantees that
any strategy also satisfies the uniqueness condition.
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We denote the observed information on the edges
e(2), e(5), e(6), e(7), e(8) by YE,1, YE,2, YE,3, YE,4, YE,5. As
Fig. 1, Eve adds Z1, Z2 in edges e(2), e(5). Then, the matrices
HB , KE , and HE are given as
HB =
 1 10 0
0 0
 , KE =

0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 ,
HE =

0 0
0 0
0 1
1 1
0 1
 . (16)
In this case, to keep the secrecy of the message to be
transmitted, Alice and Bob can use coding as follows. When
Alice’s message is M ∈ Fq , Alice prepares scramble random
number L1, L2, L3 ∈ Fq . These variables are assumed to
be subject to the uniform distribution independently. She
encodes them as Xi = Li for i = 1, . . . , 3 and X4 =
−M + L1 + L2 + L3. As shown in the following, under this
code, Eve cannot obtain any information for M even though
she makes active attack. Due to Theorem 1, it is sufficient
to show the secrecy when Zi = 0. Eve’s information is
YE,1 = X2, YE,2 = X1, YE,3 = X1, YE,4 = X1 + X2 and
YE,5 = X1 and the message is M = X1 + X2 + X3 − X4.
That is, her eavesdropping information is characterized by the
vectors (0, 1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 0, 0) and
the message is by the vector (1, 1, 1,−1). Since these vectors
are linearly independent, X1 +X2 +X3 −X4 is independent
of each of the variables YE,1, YE,2, YE,3, YE,4, YE,5. Hence,
the message is independent of her eavesdropping information.
Indeed, the above attack can be considered as the following.
Eve can eavesdrop all edges connected to the intermediate
node v(2) and contaminate all edges incoming to the inter-
mediate node v(2). Hence, it is natural to assume that Eve
similarly eavesdrops and contaminates at another intermediate
node v(i). That is, Eve can eavesdrop all edges connected to
the intermediate node v(i) and contaminate all edges incoming
to the intermediate node v(i). For all node v(i), this code has
the same secrecy against the above Eve’s attack for node v(i).
Furthermore, the above code has the secrecy even when the
following attack.
(B1) Eve eavesdrops one of three edges e(7), e(9), e(11)
connected to the sink node, and eavesdrops and
contaminates one of the remaining eight edges
e(1), e(2), e(3), e(4), e(5), e(6), e(8), e(10) that are
not connected to the sink node.
Indeed, the vector characterizing the transmission on any one
of three edges e(7), e(9), e(11) has only two non-zero com-
ponents, and the vector characterizing the transmission on any
one of eight edges e(1), e(2), e(3), e(4), e(5), e(6), e(8), e(10)
has only one non-zero component. Hence, any linear com-
bination of the above two vectors has only three non-zero
components at most. Therefore, the vector (1, 1, 1,−1) is
not contained by the linear space spanned by the above two
vectors. Thus, when the message is X1 +X2 +X3 −X4, the
secrecy holds under the above attack (A).
F. Problem in error detection in concrete network model
However, the network given in Figs. 1 and 2 has the problem
for the detection of the error in the following meaning. When
Eve makes an active attack, Bob’s recovering message is
different from the original message due to the contamination.
Further, Bob cannot detect the existence of the error in this
case. It is natural to require the detection of the existence of
the error when the original message cannot be recovered as
well as the secrecy. As a special attack model, we consider
the following scenario with the attack (B1).
(B2) Our node operations are fixed to the way as Fig. 2.
(B3) The message setM and all information on all edges
are F2.
(B4) The variables X1, X2, X3, X4 are given as the output
of the encoder. The encoder on the source node can
be chosen, but is restricted to linear. It is allowed to
use a scramble random number, which is an element
of L := Fk2 with a certain integer k. Formally, the
encoder is given as as a linear function fromM×L
to F42.
(B5) The decoder on the sink node can be chosen de-
pendently of the encoder and independently of Eve’s
attack.
Then, it is impossible to make a pair of an encoder and a
decoder such that the secrecy holds and Bob can detect the
existence of error.
This fact can be shown as follows. In order to detect
it, Alice needs to make an encoder such that the vector
(YB,1, YB,2, YB,3) belongs to a linear subspace because the
detection can be done only by observing that the vector does
not belongs to a certain linear subspace, which can be written
as {(YB,1, YB,2, YB,3)|c1YB,1 + c2YB,2 + c3YB,3 = 0} with a
non-zero vector (c1, c2, c3) ∈ F32. That is, the encoder needs
to be constructed so that the relation c1YB,1 + c2YB,2 +
c3YB,3 = (c1 + c2 + c3)X1 + c1X2 + c2X3 + c3X4 = 0
holds unless Eve’s injection is made. Since our field is F32,
we have three cases. (C1) (c1, c2, c3) is (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), or
(0, 0, 1). (C2) (c1, c2, c3) is (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), or (0, 1, 1). (C3)
(c1, c2, c3) is (1, 1, 1). If we impose another linear condition,
the transmitted information is restricted into a one-dimensional
subspace, which means that the message M uniquely decides
the vector (YB,1, YB,2, YB,3). Hence, if Eve eavesdrops one
suitable variable among three variables YB,1, YB,2, YB,3, Eve
can infer the original message.
In the first case (C1), one of three variables YB,1, YB,2, YB,3
is zero unless Eve’s injection is made. When YB,1 = 0, i.e.,
(c1, c2, c3) = (1, 0, 0), Bob can detect an error on the edge
e(5) or e(2) because the error on e(5) or e(2) affects YB,1 so
that YB,1 is not zero. However, Bob cannot detect any error on
the edge e(4) because the error does not affect YB,1. The same
fact can be applied to the case when YB,2 = 0. When YB,3 =
0, Bob cannot detect any error on the edge e(3) because the
error does not affect YB,3.
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In the second case (C2), two of three variables
YB,1, YB,2, YB,3 have the same value unless Eve’s injection
is made. When YB,1 = YB,2, i.e., (c1, c2, c3) = (1, 1, 0), Bob
can detect an error on the edge e(2) or e(3) because the error
on e(2) or e(3) affects YB,1 or YB,2 so that YB,1 +YB,2 is not
zero. However, Bob cannot detect any error on the edge e(4)
because the error does not affect YB,1 nor YB,2. Similarly,
When YB,2 = YB,3 (YB,1 = YB,3), Bob cannot detect any
error on the edge e(2) (e(3)).
In the third case (C3), the relation YB,1 = YB,2 + YB,3
holds, i.e., (c1, c2, c3) = (1, 1, 1). Then, the linearity of the
code implies that the message has the form a1YB,1 +a2YB,2 +
a3YB,3. Due to the relation YB,1 = YB,2 + YB,3, the value
a1YB,1 + a2YB,2 + a3YB,3 = (a1 + a2)YB,2 + (a1 + a3)YB,3
is limited to YB,1, YB,2, YB,3, or 0 because our field is F2.
Since the message is not a constant, it is limited to one of
YB,1, YB,2, YB,3. Hence, when it is YB,1, Eve can obtain the
message by eavesdropping the edge e(7). In other cases, Eve
can obtain the message in the same way.
To resolve this problem, we need to use this network
multiple times. Hence, in the next section, we discuss the case
with multiple transmission.
G. Wiretap and replacement model
In the above subsections, we have discussed the case when
Eve injects the noise in the edges EA as well as eavesdrops
the edges EE . In this subsection, we assume that EA ⊂ EE
and Eve eavesdrops the edges EE and replaces the information
on the edges EA by other information. While this assumption
implies m5 ≤ m6 and the image of η is included in the image
of ζE , the function η does not necessarily equal the function
ζE because the order that Eve sends her replaced information
to the heads of edges does not necessarily equal the order that
Eve intercepts the information on the edges. Also, this case
belongs to general wiretap and addition model (2) as follows.
Modifying the matrix Mj , we define the new matrix M ′′j as
follows. When there is an index i such that ζE(i) = j, the
j + m3-th row vector of the new matrix M ′′j is defined by
[δj+m3,j′ ]1≤j′≤m1 and the remaining part of M
′′
j is defined
as the identity matrix. Otherwise, M ′′j is defined to be Mj .
Also, we define another matrix F as follows. The ζE(i)-th row
vector of the new matrix F is defined by [θζE(i),j′ ]1≤j′≤m1
and the remaining part of F is defined as the identity matrix.
Hence, we have
YB,j =
m3∑
i=1
(M ′′m7 · · ·M ′′1 )ζB(j),iXi
+
m5∑
i′=1
(M ′′m7 · · ·M ′′1 )ζB(j),η(i′)Zi′ (17)
YE,j =
m3∑
i=1
(FM ′′m7 · · ·M ′′1 )ζE(j),iXi
+
m5∑
i′=1
(FM ′′m7 · · ·M ′′1 )ζE(j),η(i′)Zi′ . (18)
Then, we choose matrices K ′B , K
′
E , H
′
B , and H
′
E as K
′
B :=
PBM
′′
m7 · · ·M ′′1 PA, K ′E := PEFM ′′m7 · · ·M ′′1 PA, H ′B :=
PBM
′′
m7 · · ·M ′′1 PTE , and H ′E := PEFM ′′m7 · · ·M ′′1 PTE , which
satisfy conditions (2) due to (17) and (18). This model (K ′B ,
K ′E , H
′
B , H
′
E) is called the wiretap and replacement model
determined by (V,E) and (EE , EA, θ, η). Notice that the
projections PA, PB , and PE are defined in Section II-B.
Next, we discuss the strategy α′ under the matrices K ′B ,
K ′E , H
′
B , and H
′
E such that the added error Zi is given as a
function α′i of the vector [YE,j ]j∈wi . Since the decision of the
injected noise does not depend on the results of the decision,
we impose the causal condition defined in Definition 4 for the
subsets wi.
When the relation j ∈ wi holds with ζE(j) = η(i), a
strategy α′ on the wiretap and replacement model (K ′B , K
′
E ,
H ′B , H
′
E) determined by (V,E) and (EE , θ) is written by
another strategy α on the wiretap and addition model KB ,
KE , HB , and HE determined by (V,E) and (EE , θ), which
is defined as αj([YE,j′ ]j′∈wi) := α
′
j([YˆE,j′ ]j′∈wi) − YE,j .
In particular, due to the condition (5), the optimal choice
ηo, {wo,i} under the partial time-ordered condition satisfies
the relation j ∈ wo,i holds with ζE(j) = ηo(i). That is, under
the partial time-ordered condition, the strategy on the wiretap
and replacement model can be written by another strategy on
the wiretap and addition model.
However, if there is no synchronization among vertexes,
Eve can inject the replaced information to the head of an
edge before the tail of the edge sends the information to the
edge. Then, the partial time-ordered condition does not hold.
In this case, the relation j ∈ wi does not necessarily hold
with ζE(j) = η(i). Hence, a strategy α′ on the wiretap and
replacement model (K ′B , K
′
E , H
′
B , H
′
E) cannot be necessarily
written as another strategy on the wiretap and addition model
(KB , KE , HB , HE).
To see this fact, we discuss an example given in Section
II-E. In this example, the network structure of the wiretap and
replacement model is given by Fig. 3.
S
T
v(1)
v(2)
v(3)
v(4)
e’(2)
e(3)
e(4)
e(7)
e(10)
e(11) e(9)
e(6)
e(8)
1Z
Eve
,1EY
,3EY
,2EY
2Z
e(1) e’(5)
,4EY
,5EY
Fig. 3. Network of Section II-E with wiretap and replacement model. Eve
injects the replaced information on the edges e′(2) and e′(5).
III. MULTIPLE TRANSMISSION SETTING
A. General model
Now, we consider the n-transmission setting, where Alice
uses the same network n times to send a message to Bob.
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Alice’s input variable (Eve’s added variable) is given as a
matrix Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ Fm3×nq (a matrix Zn =
(Z1, . . . ,Zn) ∈ Fm5×nq ), and Bob’s (Eve’s) received variable
is given as a matrix Y nB = (YB,1, . . . ,YB,n) ∈ Fm4×nq
(a matrix Y nE = (YE,1, . . . ,YE,n) ∈ Fm6×nq ). Then, we
consider the following model as
Y nB = KBX
n +HBZ
n, (19)
Y nE = KEX
n +HEZ
n, (20)
whose realization in a concrete network will be discussed in
Sections III-B and III-C. Notice that the relations (19) and
(20) with HE = 0 (only the relation (19)) were treated as the
starting point of the paper [21] (the papers [23], [24], [25]).
In this case, regarding n transmissions of one channel as n
different edges, we consider the directed graph composed of
nm5 edges. Then, Eve’s strategy αn is given as nm5 functions
{αi,l}1≤i≤m5,1≤l≤n from Y nE to the respective components of
Zn. In this case, we extend the uniqueness condition to the
n-transmission version.
Definition 3. For any value of KExn, there uniquely exists
yn ∈ Fm6×nq such that
yn = KEx
n +HEα
n(yn). (21)
This condition is called the n-uniqueness condition.
Since we have n transmissions on each channel, the matrix
θ is given as an (nm1) × (nm1) matrix. In the following,
we see how the matrix θ is given and how the n-uniqueness
condition is satisfied in a more concrete setting.
B. Multiple transmission setting with sequential transmission
This section discusses how the model given in Section III-A
can be realized in the case with sequential transmission as
follows. Alice sends the first information X1. Then, Alice
sends the second information X2. Alice sequentially sends the
information X3, . . . ,Xn. Hence, when an injective function
τE from {1, . . . ,m1}×{1, . . . , n} to {1, . . . , nm1} gives the
time ordering of nm1 edges, it satisfies the condition
τE(i, l) ≤ τE(i′, l′) when i ≤ i′ ∧ l ≤ l′. (22)
Here, we assume that the topology and dynamics of the
network and the edge attacked by Eve do not change during
n transmissions, which is called the stationary condition. All
operations in intermediate nodes are linear. Also, we assume
that the time ordering on the network flow does not cause
any correlation with the delayed information like Fig. 1 unless
Eve’s injection is made, i.e., the l-th information YB,l received
by Bob is independent of X1, . . . ,Xl−1,Xl+1, . . . ,Xn, which
is called the independence condition. The independence con-
dition means that there is no correlation with the delayed in-
formation. Due to the stationary and independence conditions,
the (nm1)× (nm1) matrix θ satisfies that
θ(i,l),(j,k) = θ¯i,jδk,l, (23)
where θ¯i,j := θ(i,1),(j,1). When the m1×m1 matrix θ¯ satisfies
the partial time-ordered condition (5), due to (22) and (23),
the (nm1)× (nm1) matrix θ satisfies the partial time-ordered
condition (5) with respect to the time ordering τE . Since the
stationary condition guarantees that the edges attacked by Eve
do not change during n transmissions, the above condition for
θ implies the model (19) and (20). This scenario is called the
n-sequential transmission.
Since the independence condition is not so trivial, it is
needed to discuss when it is satisfied. If the l-th transmission
has no correlation with the delayed information of the previous
transmissions for l = 2, . . . , n, the independence condition
holds. In order to satisfy the above independence condition,
the acyclic condition for the network graph is often imposed.
This is because any causal time ordering on the network flow
does not cause any correlation with the delayed information
and achieves the max-flow if the network graph has no cycle
[26]. In other words, if the network graph has a cycle, there
is a possibility that a good time ordering on the network flow
that causes correlation with the delayed information. However,
there is no relation between the relations (19) and (20) and the
acyclic condition for the network graph, and the relations (19)
and (20) directly depend on the time ordering on the network
flow. That is, the acyclic condition for the network graph is not
equivalent to the existence of the effect of delayed information.
Indeed, if we employ breaking cycles on intermediate nodes
[26, Example 3.1], even when the network graph has cycles,
we can avoid any correlation with the delayed information4.
Also, see the example given in Section III-E.
To extend the causality condition, we focus on the do-
main index subsets {wi,l}1≤i≤m5,1≤l≤n of {1, . . . ,m6} ×
{1, . . . , n} for Eve’s strategy αn = {αi,l}1≤i≤m5,1≤l≤n.
Then, we define the causality condition under the order
function τE .
Definition 4. We say that the domain index subsets {wi,l}i,l
satisfy the n-causal condition under the order function τE
and the function η from {1, . . . ,m5} to {1, . . . ,m1} when the
following two conditions hold;
(A1’) The relation HE;j,i = 0 holds for (j, l) /∈ wi,l.
(A2’) The relation wi,l ⊆ wi′,l′ holds when τE(η(i), l) ≤
τE(η(i
′), l′).
Next, we focus on the domain index subsets {wi,l}i,l and
the function η from {1, . . . ,m5} to {1, . . . ,m1}. We say that
the pair (η, {wi,l}i,l) are n-admissible under θ¯ under the order
function τE when {e(k)|k ∈ Im η} = EA, the subsets {wi,l}i,l
satisfy Condition (A2’) for the n causal condition, and any
element (j, l′) ∈ wi,l satisfies
τE(ζE(j), l
′) < γθ¯(η(i), l). (24)
where the function γθ¯ is defined as
γθ¯(j, l) := min
j′
{τE(j′, l)|θ¯j′,j 6= 0}. (25)
Here, when no index j′ satisfies the condition θ¯j′,j 6= 0,
γθ¯(j, l) is defined to be nm1 + 1. In the same way as Section
4 To handle a time ordering with delayed information, one often employs
a convolution code [31]. It is used in sequential transmission, and requires
synchronization among all nodes. Also, all the intermediate nodes are required
to make a cooperative coding operation under the control of the sender and the
receiver. if we employ breaking cycles we do not need such synchronization
as well as avoiding any correlation with the delayed information.
M. HAYASHI, M. OWARI, G. KATO, AND N. CAI: REDUCTION THEOREM FOR SECRECY OVER LINEAR NETWORK CODE FOR ACTIVE ATTACKS 9
II-D, we find that the n-admissibility of the pair (η, {wi,l}i,l)
implies the n-causal condition under τE and η for the domain
index subsets {wi,l}i,l.
Given two n-admissible pairs (η, {wi,l}i,l) and
(η′, {w′i,l}i,l), we say that the pair (η, {wi,l}i,l) is superior to
(η′, {w′i,l}i,l) for Eve when w′η′−1(j),l ⊂ wη−1(j),l for j ∈ EA
and l = 1, . . . , n. Then, we choose the bijective function
τE,η from {1, . . . ,m5} × {1, . . . , n} to {1, . . . , nm5} such
that γθ¯ ◦ η ◦ τ−1E,η is monotone increasing, where γθ¯ ◦ η
is defined as γθ¯ ◦ η(i, l) = γθ¯(η(i), l). The function τE,η
expresses the order of Eve’s contamination. Then, we define
wη,i,l := {(j, l′)|τE(ζE(j), l′) < γθ¯(η(i), l)}, which satisfies
the n-admissibility under θ¯ and the order function τE .
Further, when the pair (η′, {wi,l}i,l) is n-admissible under
θ¯ and τE , the condition (24) implies wη′−1(j),l ⊂ wη,η−1(j),l
for j ∈ EA and l = 1, . . . , n, i.e., wη,i,l is the largest subset
under the n admissibility under θ¯ and τE . Hence, we obtain
the optimality of (η, {wη,i,l}i,l) when θ¯, τE , and EA are
given. Although the choice of η is not unique, the choice of
wη,η−1(j),l for j ∈ EA and l = 1, . . . , n is unique when θ¯,
τE , and EA are given.
In the same way as Lemma 1, we find that the n-
causal condition with sequential transmission guarantees the
n-uniqueness condition as follows.
Lemma 2. When a strategy α for the n-sequential trans-
mission has domain index subsets to satisfy the n-causal
condition, the strategy α satisfies the n-uniqueness condition.
Proof: Consider a big graph composed of nm1
edges {e(i, l)}1≤i≤m1,1≤l≤n and nm2 vertecies
{v(j, l)}1≤j≤m2,1≤l≤n. In this big graph, the coefficient
matrix is given in (23). We assign the nm1 edges the
number τE(i, l). The n-causal and n-uniqueness conditions
correspond to the causal and uniqueness conditions of this
bog network, respectively. Hence, Lemma 1 implies Lemma
2.
C. Multiple transmission setting with simultaneous transmis-
sion
We consider anther scenario to realize the model given in
Section III-A. Usually, we employ an error correcting code
for the information transmission on the edges in our graph.
For example, when the information transmission is done by
wireless communication, an error correcting code is always
applied. Now, we assume that the same error correcting code
is used on all the edges. Then, we set the length n to be
the same value as the transmitted information length of the
error correcting code. In this case, n transmissions are done
simultaneously in each edge. Each node makes the same node
operation for n transmissions, which implies the condition (23)
for the (nm1)× (nm1) matrix θ. Then, the relations (19) and
(20) hold because the delayed information does not appear.
This scenario is called the n-simultaneous transmission.
In fact, when we focus on the mathematical aspect, the n-
simultaneous transmission can be regarded as a special case of
the n-sequential transmission. In this case, the independence
condition always holds even when the network has a cycle.
Further, the n-uniqueness condition can be derived in a simpler
way without discussing the n-causal condition as follows.
In this scenario, given a function η from {1, . . . ,m5}
to EA ⊂ {1, . . . ,m1}, Eve chooses the added errors
(Zi,1, . . . , Zi,n) ∈ Fnq on the edge e(η(i)) ∈ EA as a function
αi of the vector [YE,j ]j∈wi with subsets {wi}1≤i≤m5 of
{1, . . . ,m6}. Hence, in the same way as the single trans-
mission, domain index subsets for α are given as subsets
wi ⊂ {1, . . . ,m6} for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m5}. In the same way
as Lemma 1, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. When a strategy α for the n-simultaneous trans-
mission has domain index subsets to satisfy the causal condi-
tion, the strategy α satisfies the n-uniqueness condition.
In addition, the wiretap and replacement model in this
setting can be introduced for the n-sequential transmission and
the n-simultaneous transmission in the same way as Section
II-G.
D. Non-local code and reduction theorem
Now, we assume only the model (19) and (20) and the n-
uniqueness condition. Since the model (19) and (20) is given,
we manage only the encoder in the sender and the decoder
in the receiver. Although the operations in the intermediate
nodes are linear and operate only on a single transmission, the
encoder and the decoder operate across several transmissions.
Such a code is called a non-local code to distinguish operations
over a single transmission. Here, we formulate a non-local
code to discuss the secrecy. Let M and L be the message set
and the set of values of the scramble random number, which is
often called the private randomness. Then, an encoder is given
as a function φn from M×L to Fm3×nq , and the decoder is
given as ψn from Fm4×nq toM. That is, the decoder does not
use the scramble random number L because it is not shared
with the decoder. Our non-local code is the pair (φn, ψn),
and is denoted by Φn. Then, we denote the message and the
scramble random number as M and L. The cardinality of M
is called the size of the code and is denoted by |Φn|. More
generally, when we focus on a sequence {ln} instead of {n},
an encoder φn is a function from M×L to Fm3×lnq , and the
decoder ψn is a function from Fm4×lnq to M.
Here, we treat KB ,KE , HB , and HE as deterministic
values, and denote the pairs (KB ,KE) and (HB , HE) by K
and H , respectively while Alice and Bob might not have the
full information for KE , HB , and HE . Also, we assume that
the matrices K and H are not changed during transmission.
In the following, we fix Φn,K,H, αn. As a measure of
the leaked information, we adopt the mutual information
I(M ;Y nE , Z
n) between M and Eve’s information Y nE and Z
n.
Since the variable Zn is given as a function of Y nE , we have
I(M ;Y nE , Z
n) = I(M ;Y nE ). Since the leaked information is
given as a function of Φn,K,H, αn in this situation, we
denote it by I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K,H, α
n].
Definition 5. When we always choose Zn = 0, the attack is
the same as the passive attack. This strategy is denoted by
αn = 0.
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When K,H are treated as random variables independent
of M,L, the leaked information is given as the expectation of
I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K,H, α
n]. This probabilistic setting expresses
the following situation. Eve cannot necessarily choose edges
to be attacked by herself. But she knows the positions of the
attacked edges, and chooses her strategy depending on the
attacked edges.
Remark 1. It is better to remark that there are two kinds
of formulations in network coding even when the network
has only one sender and one receiver. Many papers [1], [8],
[9], [27], [28] adopt the formulation, where the users can
control the coding operation in intermediate nodes. However,
this paper adopts another formulation, in which, the non-local
coding operations are done only for the input variable X and
the output variable YB like the papers [7], [20], [21], [23],
[24], [25]. In contrast, all intermediate nodes make only linear
operations over a single transmission, which is often called
local encoding in [23], [24], [25]. Since the linear operations
in intermediate nodes cannot be controlled by the sender and
the receiver, this formulation contains the case when a part of
intermediate nodes do not work and output 0 always.
In the former setting, it is often allowed to employ the
private randomness in intermediate nodes. However, we adopt
the latter setting, i.e., no non-local coding operation is allowed
in intermediate nodes, and each intermediate node is required
to make the same linear operation on each alphabet. That is,
the operations in intermediate nodes are linear and are not
changed during n transmissions. The private randomness is
not employed in intermediate nodes.
Now, we have the following reduction theorem.
Theorem 2 (Reduction Theorem). When the triplet
(K,H, αn) satisfies the uniqueness condition, Eve’s
information Y nE (α
n) with strategy αn can be calculated from
Eve’s information Y nE (0) with strategy 0 (the passive attack),
and Y nE (0) is also calculated from Y
n
E (α
n). Hence, we have
the equation
I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K, 0, 0] =I(M ;Y
n
E )[Φn,K,H, 0]
=I(M ;Y nE )[Φn,K,H, α
n]. (26)
Proof: Since the first equation follows from the definition, we
show the second equation. We define two random variables
Y nE (0) := KEX
n and Y nE (α
n) := KEX
n + HEZ
n. Due
to the uniqueness condition of Y nE (α
n), for each Y nE (0) =
KEX
n, we can uniquely identify Y nE (α
n). Therefore, we have
I(M ;Y nE (0)) ≥ I(M ;Y nE (αn)). Conversely, since Y nE (0) is
given as a function of Y nE (α
n), Zn, and HE , we have the
opposite inequality.
Remark 2. Theorem 2 discusses the unicast case. It can be
trivially extended to the multicast case because we do not
discuss the decoder. It can also be extended to the multiple
unicast case, whose network is composed of several pairs of
sender and receiver. When there are k pairs in this setting, the
messages M and the scramble random numbers L have the
forms (M1, . . . ,Mk) and (L1, . . . , Lk). Thus, we can apply
Theorem 2 to the multiple unicast case. The detail discussion
for this extension is discussed in the paper [30].
Remark 3. One may consider the following type of attack
when Alice sends the i-th transmission after Bob receives the
i− 1-th transmission. Eve changes the edge to be attacked in
the i-th transmission dependently of the information that Eve
obtains in the previous i−1 transmissions. Such an attack was
discussed in [29] when there is no noise injection. Theorem
2 does not consider such a situation because it assumes that
Eve attacks the same edges for each transmission. However,
Theorem 2 can be applied to this kind of attack in the
following way. That is, we find that Eve’s information with
noise injection can be simulated by Eve’s information without
noise injection even when the attacked edges are changed in
the above way.
To see this reduction, we consider m transmissions over
the network given by the direct graph (V,E). We define the
big graph (Vm, Em), where Vm := {(v, i)}v∈V,1≤i≤m and
Em := {(e, i)}e∈E,1≤i≤m and (v, i) and (e, i) express the
vertex v and the edge e on the i-th transmission, respectively.
Then, we can apply Theorem 2 with n = 1 to the network
given by the directed graph (Vm, Em) when the attacked edges
are changed in the above way. Hence, we obtain the above
reduction statement under the uniqueness condition for the
network decided by the directed graph (Vm, Em).
E. Application to network model in Subsection II-E
We consider how to apply the multiple transmission setting
with sequential transmission with n = 2 to the network given
in Subsection II-E, i.e., we discuss the network given in Figs.
1 and 2 over the field Fq with n = 2. Then, we analyze the
secrecy by applying Theorem 2.
Assume that Eve eavesdrops edges
e(2), e(5), e(6), e(7), e(8) and contaminates edges
e(2), e(5) as Fig. 1. Then, we set the function τE from
{1, . . . , 11} × {1, 2} to {1, . . . , 22} as
τE(i, l) = i+ 11(l − 1). (27)
Under the choice of η given in (14), the function τE,η can be
set in another way as
τE,η(i, l) = i+ 2(l − 1). (28)
Since γθ¯(2, 1) = 7, γθ¯(5, 1) = 6, γθ¯(2, 2) = 18, γθ¯(5, 2) =
17, we have
wη,1,1 ={(1, 1), (2, 1)}, wη,2,1 = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1)}
wη,1,2 ={(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1), (5, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2)}
wη,2,2 ={(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1),
(4, 1), (5, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 2)}.
However, when the function τE is changed as
τE(i, l) = i+ 5(l − 1) for i = 1, . . . , 5 (29)
τE(i, l) = 5 + i+ 6(l − 1) for i = 6, . . . , 11, (30)
wη,i,l has a different form as follows. Under the choice of η
given in (14), while Eve can choose τE,η in the same way
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TABLE II
SUMMARY OF SECURITY ANALYSIS
Node Eavesdropping Vector η Detection Recovery
v(1)
e(1) : L1 (1, 0, 0) η(1) = 1
−Z1κ YB,2 − YB,3e(5) : L1 (1, 0, 0) η(2) = 5
e(10) : L1 (1, 0, 0) η(3) = 10
v(2)
e(2) : L1κ+ L2(1 + κ) +Mκ (κ, 1 + κ, κ)
Z2 − Z1κ YB,2 − YB,3
e(5) : L1 (1, 0, 0) η(1) = 5
e(6) : L1 (1, 0, 0)
e(7) : L1(1 + κ) + L2(1 + κ) +Mκ (1 + κ, 1 + κ, κ) η(2) = 2
e(8) : L1 (1, 0, 0)
v(3)
e(3) : L2 +M (0, 1, 1) η(1) = 3
−(Z1 + Z2 + Z3)κ (YB,1 − YB,3(1 + κ))κ−1e(6) : L1 (1, 0, 0) η(2) = 6
e(9) : L1 + L2 +M (1, 1, 1) η(3) = 9
v(4)
e(4) : L2 (0, 1, 0) η(1) = 4
−Z1 − Z2 − Z4 YB,2(1 + κ)− YB,1e(8) : L1 (1, 0, 0) η(2) = 8e(10) : L1 (1, 0, 0) η(3) = 10
e(11) : L1 + L2 (1, 1, 0) η(4) = 11
Detection expresses YB,1 − (YB,3 + YB,2κ). If this value is not zero, Bob considers that there exists the contamination. Recovery expresses Bob’s method
that decodes the message M dependently of v(i).
as (28), since γθ¯(2, 1) = 12, γθ¯(5, 1) = 11, γθ¯(2, 2) = 18,
γθ¯(5, 2) = 17, we have
wη,1,1 ={(1, 1), (2, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2)}
wη,2,1 ={(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2)}
wη,1,2 ={(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1), (5, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2)}
wη,2,2 ={(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1),
(4, 1), (5, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 2)}.
We construct a code, in which, the secrecy holds and Bob
can detect the existence of the error in this case. For this aim,
we consider two cases; (i) There exists an element κ ∈ Fq
to satisfy the equation κ2 = κ + 1. (ii) No element κ ∈ Fq
satisfies the equation κ2 = κ+ 1. Our code works even with
n = 1 in the case (i). But, it requires n = 2 in the case (ii).
For simplicity, we give our code with n = 2 even in the case
(i).
Assume the case (i). Alice’s message is M = (M1,M2) ∈
F2q , and Alice prepares scramble random numbers Li =
(Li,1, Li,2) ∈ F2q with i = 1, 2. These variables are assumed
to be subject to the uniform distribution independently. She
encodes them as X1 = L1, X2 = L1κ + L2(1 + κ) + Mκ,
X3 = L2 + M , and X4 = L2. When Z1 = Z2 = 0, Bob
receives
YB,1 = X1 +X2 = L1(1 + κ) + L2(1 + κ) +Mκ,
YB,2 = X1 +X3 = L1 + L2 +M,
YB,3 = X1 +X4 = L1 + L2.
(31)
Then, since M = YB,2 − YB,3, he recovers the message by
using YB,2 − YB,3.
As shown in the following, under this code, Eve can-
not obtain any information for M even though she makes
active attack. Due to Theorem 2, it is sufficient to show
the secrecy when Zi = 0. Eve’s information is YE,1 =
L1κ + L2(1 + κ) + Mκ, YE,2 = L1, YE,3 = L1, YE,4 =
L1(1 + κ) +L2(1 + κ) +Mκ, and YE,5 = L1. That is, when
variables L1, L2,M are described by the vectors (1, 0, 0),
(0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), respectively, her eavesdropping information
is characterized by the vectors (κ, 1+κ, κ), (1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0),
(1 + κ, 1 + κ, κ), and (1, 0, 0) , and the message is by the
vector (0, 0, 1). Since these vectors are linearly independent,
the message is independent of her eavesdropping information.
Indeed, the above attack can be considered as the following.
Eve can eavesdrop all edges connected to the intermediate
node v(2) and contaminate all edges incoming to the interme-
diate node v(2). The above setting means that the intermediate
node v(2) is partially captured by Eve. As other settings, we
consider the case when Eve attacks another node v(i) for
i = 1, 3, 4. In this case, we allow a slightly stronger attack, i.e.,
Eve can eavesdrop and contaminate all edges connected to the
intermediate node v(i). That is, Eve’s attack is summarized as
(B1’) Eve can choose any one of nodes v(1), . . . , v(4).
When v(2) is chosen, she eavesdrops all edges con-
nected to v(2) and contaminates all edges incoming
to v(2). When v(i) is chosen for i = 1, 3, 4, she
eavesdrops and contaminates all edges connected to
v(i).
Under this attack, this code has the same secrecy as summa-
rized in Table II.
In the case (ii), we set κ as the matrix
(
0 1
1 1
)
. Then,
we introduce the algebraic extension Fq[κ] of the field Fq
by using the element e to satisfy the equation κ2 = κ + 1.
Then, we identify an element (x1, x2) ∈ F2q with x1 + x2κ ∈
Fq[κ]. Hence, the multiplication of the matrix κ in F2q can
be identified with the multiplication of κ in Fq[κ]. The above
analysis works by identifying F2q with the algebraic extension
Fq[κ] in the case (ii).
F. Error detection
Next, we consider another type of security, i.e., the de-
tectability of the existence of the error when n = 2 with
the assumptions (B1’), (B2) and the following alternative
assumption;
(B3’) The message setM is F2q , and all information on all
edges per single use are Fq .
(B4’) The encoder on the source node can be chosen, but
is restricted to linear. It is allowed to use a scramble
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random number, which is an element of L := Fkq
with a certain integer k. Formally, the encoder is
given as as a linear function from M×L to F8q .
We employ the code given in Subsection III-E and consider
that the contamination exists when YB,1 − (YB,3 + YB,2κ) is
not zero. This code satisfies the secrecy and the detectability
as follows.
To consider the case with v(2), we set η(1) = 5, η(2) =
2. Regardless of whether Eve makes contamination, YB,2 −
YB,3 = L1 + L2 + Z1 + M − (L1 + L2 + Z1) = M . In the
following, YB,i for i = 1, 2, 3 expresses the variable when Eve
makes contamination. Hence, Bob always recovers the original
message M . Therefore, this code satisfies the desired security
in the case with Fig. 1.
In the case of v(3), we set η(1) = 3, η(2) = 6, η(3) = 9.
Then, YB,1−(YB,3+YB,2κ) is calculated to −(Z1+Z2+Z3)κ.
Hence, when Z1 + Z2 + Z3 = 0, Bob detect no error. In this
case, the contamination Z1, Z2, and Z3 do not change YB,2−
YB,3, i.e., do not cause any error for the decoded message.
Hence, in order to detect an error in the decoded message,
it is sufficient to check whether YB,1 − (YB,3 + YB,2κ) is
zero or not. Since YB,2 = X1 + X3 + Z1 + Z2 + Z3, we
have Mκ = L1(1 + κ) + L2(1 + κ) +Mκ− (L1 + L2)(1 +
κ) = YB,1 − YB,3(1 + κ). Hence, if Bob knows that only the
edges e(3), e(6), and e(9) are contaminated, he can recover
the message by (YB,1 − YB,3(1 + κ))κ−1.
In the case of v(4), we set η(1) = 4, η(2) = 8, η(3) =
10, η(4) = 11. When YB,1 − (YB,3 + YB,2κ) = −(Z1 +Z2 +
Z4) = 0, Bob detects no error. In this case, the errors Z1, Z2,
and Z4 do not change YB,2 − YB,3. Hence, it is sufficient to
check whether YB,1−(YB,3+YB,2κ) is zero or not. In addition,
if Bob knows that only the edges e(4), e(8), e(10), e(11) are
contaminated, he can recover the message by YB,2(1 + κ) −
YB,1.
Similarly, in the case of v(1), we set η(1) = 1, η(2) = 5,
η(3) = 10. If Bob knows that only the edges e(1), e(5), e(10)
are contaminated, he can recover the message by the original
method YB,2−YB,3 because it equals L1+L2+M+Z1−(L1+
L2 +Z1). In summary, when this type attack is done, Bob can
detect the existence of the error. If he identifies the attacked
node v(i) by another method, he can recover the message.
G. Solution of problem given in Subsection II-F
Next, we consider how to resolve the problem arisen in
Subsection II-F. That is, we discuss another type of attack
given as (B1), and study the secrecy and the detectability of
the existence of the error under the above-explained code with
the assumptions (B2), (B3’), (B4’), and (B5).
To discuss this problem, we divide this network into two
layers. The lower layer consists of the edges e(7), e(9), e(11),
which connected to the sink node. The upper layer does of
the remaining edges. Eve eavesdrops and contaminates any
one edge among the upper layer, and eavesdrops any one edge
among the lower layer.
The vectors corresponding to the edges of the upper layer
are (1, 0, 0), (κ, 1 + κ, κ), (0, 1, 1), (0, 1, 0). The vectors cor-
responding to the edges of the lower layer are (1+κ, 1+κ, κ),
(1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0). Any linear combination from the upper and
lower layers is not (0, 0, 1). Hence, the secrecy holds under the
lower type attack. Since the contamination of this type attack
is contained in the contamination of the attack discussed in
the previous subsection. the detectability also holds.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have discussed how sequential error injection affects the
information leaked to Eve when node operations are linear.
To discuss this problem, we have considered the possibility
that the network does not have synchronization so that the
information transmission on an edges starts before the end of
the the information transmission on the previous edge. Hence,
Eve might contaminate the information on several edges by
using the original information of these edges. Also, we have
discussed the multiple uses of the same network when the
topology and the dynamics of the network does not changes
and there is no correlation with the delayed information.
As a result, we have shown that there is no improvement by
injecting an artificial noise on attacked edges. This result can
be regarded as a kind of reduction theorem because the secrecy
analysis with contamination can be reduced to that without
contamination. Indeed, when the linearity is not imposed, there
is a counterexample of this reduction theorem [32].
In addition, we have derived the matrix formulas (19) and
(20) for the relation between the outputs of Alice and Bob
and the inputs of Alice and Eve in the case with the multiple
transmission. As the extension of Theorem 1, the similar
reduction theorem (Theorem 2) holds even for the multiple
transmission. In fact, as explained in Subsection III-G, this
extension is essential because there exists an attack model over
a network model such that the secrecy and the detectability of
the error are possible with multiple uses of the same network
while it is impossible with the single use of the network. Also,
another paper will discuss the application of these results to
the asymptotic setting [30].
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